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To even the most dedicated scholars, the concept of privacy has proven "ex-
asperatingly vague and evanescent"' and "infected with pernicious ambigui-
ties."2 Because privacy is difficult to define, it does not fit neatly into existing
legal frameworks.3 Instead, privacy has produced years of "well-meaning but
intractable debates."4 English legal scholar and privacy advocate Raymond
Wacks suggests that "[i]nstead of pursuing the false god of 'privacy', attention
should be paid to identifying what specific interests of the individual we think
the law ought to protect."'
Following this advice, many legal scholars grappling with the problem of
protecting privacy have advocated a more operationalized view of privacy that
breaks the abstract concept into concrete assertions more readily incorporated
t J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
The author wishes to express his deep gratitude to the associates and editors of the Com-
mLaw Conspectus for their hard work on this project.
I Daniel Solove, "I've Got Nothing to Hide " and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 754 (2007) (quoting ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRI-
VACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971)).
2 Id. at 754 (quoting Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35
(1967)).
3 RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 10-11 (1989).
Wacks argues that a rights-based approach to privacy, as opposed to a holistic approach,
will avoid forcing personal information problems into the "strait-jacket of 'privacy."' Id. at
10.
4 Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a Re-
Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 128 (2006); Solove,
supra note 1, at 754.
5 WACKS, supra note 3, at 10. Writing primarily from the standpoint of English legal
theory, Wacks cites American commentator R.F. Hixon who acknowledged that "a natural
'right' to privacy is simply inconceivable as a legal right ... Privacy itself is beyond the
scope of the law." Id.
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into the legal system.6 Like the Supreme Court's approach in Miranda v. Ari-
zona that operationalized due process as a series of discrete rights,7 privacy
reform is best approached in small increments that avoid the paralysis histori-
cally associated with comprehensive reform. Abandoned efforts at privacy re-
form and dead comprehensive data protection statutes that sought to protect
privacy-something they could not define-litter the halls of the United States
Congress.8 With privacy's amorphous nature and technology's ever-evolving
nature,9 the omnibus approach to privacy actually works against such reform
materializing."
To avoid this problem and to address the growing need for privacy reform,
the solution should start small and be done deliberately piecemeal. Contrary to
some advocates for comprehensive privacy reform,' piecemeal construction is
not necessarily a bad thing. Many modem privacy and data protection rights
were first established as a small nucleus that grew organically as political and
practical realities changed. 2 To begin addressing the ever-increasing problem
6 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1091-92
(2002) (suggesting that our concept of privacy should be viewed through a pragmatic prism
of how such a conception solves concrete social and legal problems).
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-74 (1966) (operationalizing the broadly
worded protections of the Fifth Amendment as a constellation of narrowly circumscribed
rights that can be administered efficiently to improve the interrogation process for both the
subject, by assuring him of his constitutionally guaranteed protections, and the police, by
providing an easily implemented rule).
8 See, e.g., Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 69, 108th Cong. (2003) (re-
quiring "the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe regulations to protect the privacy of
personal information collected from and about individuals ... not covered by the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act ... to provide greater individual control over the collection
and use of that information .... ); Data-Mining Reporting Act of 2004, H.R. 4290, 108th
Cong. § 3 (2004) (requiring "[t]he head of each department or agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment that is engaged in any activity to use or develop data-mining technology ... [to]
submit a public report to Congress on all such activities ...."); Consumer Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 2005, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. § 102 (2005) (requiring data collectors to estab-
lish privacy policies and to notify consumers when their personally identifiable information
will be used for purposes unrelated to the transaction and to update consumers on material
changes to the privacy policy).
9 See Jonathan K. Sobel, et al., The Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern,
and the Contract Law Dynamics Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE
55-56 (Anupam Chander et al. eds. 2008).
10 Id. at 57.
11 See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Our Data, Ourselves, WIRED, May 15, 2008,
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/05/securitymatter
s 0515 [hereinafter Our Data, Ourselves]; 153 CONG. REC. S1635-38 (daily ed. Feb. 6,
2007) (statements of Sens. Specter & Feingold) (introducing the Personal Data Privacy and
Security Act of 2007).
12 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1681-1681x (2006)); Consumer Credit Reporting Reform
Act of 1996 ("CCRRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 119 Stat. 3009-426 (1996) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006)); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FAC-
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of diminishing data privacy, we need a narrow, simple principle that can act as
an effective stopgap. Such a measure would provide some degree of near-term
oversight and accountability of the watchers to the watched; it would also al-
low for legislative and judicial flexibility to deal with rapidly changing tech-
nology and services. This Comment proposes a private right of audit that
would, at the very least, allow consumers "a look in the books" and a chance to
inspect the information being collected about them. The proposed statute
pragmatically balances the need for a broad new paradigm-information as a
negative externalityl"-with the equally weighty need to fit solutions within the
practical realities of politics and business. 4
This Comment examines the contours of a specific legal interest within the
suite of interests that comprise "privacy" in the context of commercial data
storage. Part I briefly recaps how the collection of private information by
commercial entities has developed from a trivial problem into a growing and
discrete threat with real harms. This discussion encompasses commercial da-
ta's changing role and its new uses that affect private business, government
actions and, ultimately, individual lives. Part II then details the broad base of
legal and political support for the idea that data collection regimes, both gov-
emmental and private, should be accountable to the subjects of that data. While
not exhaustive, the discussion highlights some of the important touchstones of
modem data privacy, including past, current, and proposed legislation, busi-
TA"), Pub. L. No. 108-59, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 and 20
U.S.C. § 9701-9708) (2006). The 1996 CCRRA added, among other changes, the concept of
"adverse actions" against the consumer and further refinements of the disputed information
procedures. § 2411, 110 Stat. 3009-426, 443-45 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m). The 2003
FACTA contained many notable changes in addition to providing for free annual credit
reports, including requiring the industry to develop "red flag" rules to spot identity theft and
allowing "affiliate sharing" subject to consumer disclosure and choice. § 114, 117 Stat. 1952
at 1960-61 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m); §214, 117 Stat. 1952 at 1980-83 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681s).
13 See Bruce Schneier, The Tech Lab: Bruce Schneier, BBC ONLINE, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/7897892.stm [hereinafter The Tech Lab] (asserting
that data is "a natural by-product of every computer-mediated interaction. It stays around
forever, unless it's disposed of. It is valuable when reused, but it must be done carefully.
Otherwise, its after-effects are toxic.").
14 The business community-and, correspondingly, congresspersons on behalf of their
industry constituency-has traditionally opposed privacy reform efforts. See, e.g., Joel Mi-
chael Schwartz, A 'Case of Identity': A Gaping Hole in the Chain of Evidence of Cyber-
Crime, 9 B.U. J. Sd. & TECH. L. 92, 115-16 (2003) (comparing the privacy and criminal
issues of public terminals with commercial mail receiving agencies and noting the opposi-
tion to new regulations for commercial mail receiving agencies by businesses "were charac-
teristic of their interests."); Gregory Schaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The
Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 44 (2000) (discussing President Bill Clinton's administration's defense
of businesses in negotiating over the European Union approaches to issues in data privacy).
But see infra Part III for a discussion of the growing support for change.
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ness best practices, and international principles. Part III analyzes the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the diverse practical and legal approaches often
employed when attempting to address harms associated with private data ag-
gregation. Finally, Part IV presents and weighs the various components of a
right of audit, suggesting those that are truly central to establishing an effective
right and explaining why some components could ultimately prove counter-
productive.
1I. WATCHING THE WATCHERS
A. Junk Mail and Credit Card Offers?
As Daniel Solove argues in "I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other Misun-
derstandings of Privacy, there is little interest in protecting oneself from ap-
parently innocuous data gathering, 5 which may simply result in more advertis-
ing. An everyday example of data gathering occurs at supermarkets, which use
information they obtain from customer loyalty cards to send consumers tar-
geted coupons and advertisements. 6 Although many consumers using these
loyalty cards realize that the stores they patronize track their purchasing habits,
this data mining does not bother most consumers enough to give up the use of
these loyalty cards.17 As one Kroger customer said, "If it was anything else, it
might be different .... But it's groceries. So, what the heck? Who cares who
knows what I eat?"'8 This reflexive indifference, a typical reaction to private
sector data gathering in most industries, extends from the common man all the
way to Supreme Court justices. Justice Antonin Scalia said that information to
be considered private "doesn't include what groceries I buy," unless the infor-
15 Solove, supra note 1, at 756 (recognizing that the majority of information in data
banks is not "sensitive" information, which he defines as information which would inhibit
people's activities if the information were known).
16 Dan Sewell, The Price of Loyalty, EXPRESS (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 9, 2009, at 31. The
Kroger Company, an American supermarket chain, also has an ownership stake in the data-
mining firm DunnhumbyUSA, which also has contracts with Coca-Cola Co., Home Depot
Corp., Procter & Gamble Co., Macy's Inc., and Kraft Foods Inc. Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. One consumer's observations on data mining indicates that the practice is so per-
vasive that some consumers simply give up on avoiding it, saying:
We all have more demographic labels attached to us in various databases than we'll
ever know, and thinking about it would make me insane, so I just do what I can to limit
my exposure to them and let the rest go. The amount of work required to be free of it
all would probably result in me living in a cave as a hermit.
Martin H. Bosworth, Alternatives to Loyalty Cards: Retail Chains Largely Mum About
Their Policies, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/loyaltycards2.html.
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mation is "shameful."' 9 This concept is the essence of the "nothing to hide"
argument: the perception that an interest in privacy necessarily arises from an
immoral or unethical desire to hide something. ° Thus, advocates for privacy
and personal information reform in the private sector have had a hard time
gaining traction because the visible harms are not weighty and the weighty
harms are not visible.
B. It's Not Just Groceries Anymore: Broader and Deeper Collection, Wider
Dissemination and Use
The threat of private data aggregation is rapidly becoming less trivial for
several reasons.2' The collection of personal information has become broader
and deeper in keeping with a series of related developments: the wholesale
adoption of information technology in business, the digitization of records tra-
ditionally kept on paper, and the deliberate combining and mining of these data
stores.22 That is, more areas of our public lives are being recorded, and they are
being recorded in greater depth and detail than in the past.23
The scope of the privacy problem has expanded in every direction. More
entities now keep more records on more people than in the past. Acxiom, the
world's largest data aggregator, holds information on ninety-six percent of
American households.24 Richard Behar explains that "[o]nce upon a time in
19 Posting of Daniel Solove, Justice Scalia's Dossier: Interesting Issues about Privacy
and Ethics, to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/j ustice-scalias_2.html (Apr. 29,
2009, 10:43 EST). When presented with a fifteen page dossier of his personal information
compiled by a class at the Fordham University School of Law, Scalia characterized the
compilation as "an example of perfectly legal, abominably poor judgment." He did not
make clear whether this pronouncement extended to corporate entities engaged in for-profit
aggregation or was limited to law students working on a class project. Id.
20 Solove, supra note 1, at 764; see also Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Repu-
tation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 11 (1979) (describing one sense of privacy as "the concealment
of discreditable facts about oneself' as "closely related to reputation" since "it is a method.
•. of enhancing reputation.").
21 See Bruce Schneier, Op-Ed., Your Vanishing Privacy: Welcome to the World of
Wholesale Surveillance, Where Many Entities Track People 's Electronic Footprints, MINN.
STAR TRIB., Mar. 5, 2006, at AA1 [hereinafter Your Vanishing Privacy] (describing the cor-
relation between the increase in computer usage for transactions and the increase in the in-
formation from those transactions being stored, analyzed, and repurposed).
22 The Tech Lab, supra note 13 (imagining a future "where everything about you is
saved. A future where your actions are recorded, your movements are tracked, and your
conversations are no longer ephemeral. A future brought to you not by some 1984-like dys-
topia, but by the natural tendencies of computers to produce data.").
23 See Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21.
24 Marcy E. Peek, Beyond Contract: Utilizing Restitution to Reach Shadow Offenders
and Safeguard Information Privacy, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 137 (Anu-
pam Chander et al. eds., 2008).
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America a savvy store clerk knew that you had, say, three kids, an old Ford, a
pool, and a passion for golf and yellow sweaters. Today Acxiom is that store
clerk .... [but] [i]t manages 20 billion customer records . . -." ChoicePoint,
another data broker, "owns an astounding 19 billion records, about 65 times as
many pieces of information as there are people in the United States. 26 With
such vast amounts of information in its hands, ChoicePoint likely has more
information on most individuals than the federal government does."
Instead of the usual public record information such as name, address, phone
number, and date of birth, the data kept is as varied as the activities individuals
engage in.28 For instance, Acxiom groups individuals by "lifestyle clusters"
that reflect the constellation of activities and traits Acxiom knows about the
individual.29 This sort of dossier-building can be as detailed as the information
sources that feed it." While in the past these dossiers have largely been com-
prised of public records, today companies combine additional sources of in-
formation, such as customer loyalty cards and even Web site cookies, to create
profiles of individuals that are much more useful for business purposes-and
are more concerning to the individuals behind these profiles.3' One corporation,
Verified Identity Pass Inc., has gone even further: as part of the Registered
Traveler program, Verified Identity Pass collected biometric information-
fingerprints and even retinal scans-from clients in exchange for expedited
security processing at airports.32
25 Richard Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom?, FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 142. See also
Acxiom, Acxiom Corporation Company Overview, http://www.acxiom.com/overview (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009) (describing the company as the "developer of some of the largest and
most sophisticated business intelligence and marketing databases in the world ....").
26 Shane Harris, Private Eye, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, Mar. 16, 2004,
http://www.govexec.com/features/0304/0304sl.htm. ChoicePoint is now wholly owned by
the parent company of LexisNexis, Reed Elsevier. LexisNexis ChoicePoint, Overview,
http:/ www.choicepoint.com/about/overview.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
27 Harris, supra note 26.
28 Joseph Apfelroth, Regulating Commercial Data Brokers in the Wake of Recent Iden-
tity Theft Schemes, 2 Bus. L. BRIEF 33, 33 (2005).
29 Behar, supra note 25, at 144 (explaining that Acxiom's lifestyle clusters "rang[e]
from 'Rolling Stones' and 'Single City Struggles' to 'Timeless Elders."').
30 See Identity Theft. Recent Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Consumer
Information Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 2
(2005) (statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
31 See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1092-93 (2001).
32 Samantha Bomkamp, Unclear What Happens to Personal Info with Clear, June 26,
2009, USA TODAY.COM, http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-06-29-clear-personal-
dataN.htm. Verified Pass Inc. has since folded. A notice on its Clear program Web site
pledges that any personal identification sold would "not be used for any purpose other than
a Registered Traveler program operated by a Transportation Security Administration author-
ized service provider." Clear, Clear Lanes Are No Longer Available, http://flyclear.com/
(last visited Aug. 27, 2009).
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Data brokers, however, merely represent the most visible face of private-
sector data collection.33 Even companies not explicitly in the business of col-
lecting customer data can and do compile significant records through contact
with consumers.34 Retail behemoth Wal-Mart serves 100 million customers a
week, nearly a third of the U.S. population. 5 From these transactions it has
compiled nearly sixty-five terabytes of data on its customers.36 Additionally,
"affiliate data sharing" programs disseminate customer records to companies
with whom the customer may not have an established relationship.37 Affiliate
data sharing is the industry term for one business sharing its customer records
with another business; this could be a bank sharing records with another
bank,3" or even, under a proposed Internal Revenue Service rule, a tax preparer
selling tax return information directly to a data broker.39
33 See, e.g., Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21; Harris, supra note 26.
34 See, e.g., Sewell, supra note 16 (listing Coca-Cola Co., Home Depot Corp., Procter &
Gamble Co., Macy's Inc., and Kraft Foods Inc. as other clients of data-broker Dunnhum-
byUSA); see also Constance L. Hays, What They Know About You, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2004, at BU 1.
35 Hays, supra note 34 (noting that with such a volume of sales, "Wal-Mart has access
to information about a broad slice of America - from individual Social Security and driver's
license numbers to geographic proclivities for Mallomars, or lipsticks, or jugs of anti-
freeze."); see CIA, The World Factbook: United States,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (follow "People ::
United States" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 10, 2009) (estimating the U.S. population in
July 2009 to be 307,212,123 people) [hereinafter The World Factbook].
36 To illustrate how much data sixty-five terabytes actually provides, consider that more
than 650 text-only (ASCII) files (such as information that would be kept in a purchasing
records database) can fit into one megabyte. With the U.S. population at approximately 300
million people, sixty-five terabytes of data means that Wal-Mart's servers have enough data
to compile the equivalent of a 150-page dossier on the purchasing habits of every man,
woman, and child in the United States. That is a lot of groceries. See Setec Investigations,
Inc., How Many Pages per Gigabyte and Megabyte?,
http://www.setecinvestigations.com/resources/techhints/Pagesper Gigabyte.pdf (giving
approximate numbers of documents which can be carried in different memory units); The
World Factbook, supra note 35.
37 Chris Hoofnagle, Op-Ed., Is Your Life an Open Book? And Who's Reading It?, AK-
RON BEACON J. (Akron, Ohio), Sept. 8, 2003, at B3. ChoicePoint and Acxiom's use of the
terms "individual" and "household" in lieu of "customer" is telling. While this comment
uses these terms interchangeably, the most accurate term to describe this asymmetric rela-
tionship is arguably "subject."
38 See id.
39 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 7216, 70 Fed. Reg. 72954 (Dec. 8, 2005) (examining "proposed
regulations to update the rules regarding the disclosure and use of tax return information by
tax return preparers. The proposed regulations announce new and additional rules for tax-
payers to consent electronically to the disclosure or use of their tax return information by tax
return preparers."); see also Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comments to IRS on
Tax Return Info Sharing, Mar. 8, 2006, http://epic.org/privacy/tax/irscom3806.html (dis-
cussing how the proposed rules could lead to ineffective consent and unscrupulous disclo-
sure of tax records).
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The significant role of the Internet in American society means that the in-
formation garnered from a user's online activities provides a significantly more
comprehensive, nuanced, and "deeper" view of the individual than might be
assembled from twentieth-century methods like loyalty cards and public re-
cords.4" In 2006, America Online (now AOL) intentionally released "ano-
nymized" search results of 657,000 subscribers.4' However, to AOL's chagrin,
the allegedly anonymized data released quickly proved how even anonymous
Web search records are actually highly informative, highly personal, and in
many cases, highly identifiable.42 Similarly, in 2008, Viacom Corporation sub-
poenaed the entire viewing history, including usernames and IP addresses, of
the online video-sharing service YouTube as part of its copyright infringement
suit against Google.43 DoubleClick, an online advertising company, now owned
by Google, 4 has the ability to examine and "merge" cookies from disparate
Web sites to generate a significantly more comprehensive picture of a user's
online activities than would be available to any one operator.45 In the world of
Internet service providers ("ISPs"), companies like United States-based Ne-
buAd, now defunct,46 and United Kingdom-based Phorm47 recently piloted
40 See The Tech Lab, supra note 13 (explaining that computer-mediated transactions
allow information to be saved more easily, accessed more widely, and combined more read-
ily).
41 Declan McCullagh, AOL's Disturbing Glimpse into Users' Lives, CNET NEWS, Aug.
7, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1030_3-6103098.html.
42 Id. (providing numerous illustrations of how search queries are a widely eclectic mix
of the mundane and the deeply personal). For example, one AOL user searched for "calories
in bananas" before moving on to searching for "can you adopt after a suicide attempt" and
"divorce laws in ohio" [sic]. Id. See also Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face is Ex-
posed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al (illustrating how
anonymized Web search information can be traced back to particular individuals because of
the richer and more comprehensive sources of data than previous forms).
43 Miguel Helft, Google Told to Turn Over User Data of YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2008, at C 1.
44 Louise Story & Miguel Helft, Google Buys DoubleClickfor $3.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2007, at C1.
45 See George R. Milne, Privacy and Ethical Issues in Database/Interactive Marketing
and Public Policy: A Research Framework and Overview of the Special Issue, 19 JOURNAL
OF PUBLIC POL'Y & MARKETING 1, 4 (2000), available at http://www.atypon-
link.com/AMA/doi/pdf/1 0.1 509/jppm. 19.1.1.16934.
46 See Posting of Scott Austin, Turning Out the Lights: NebuAd, to WSJ BLOGS: VEN-
TURE CAPITAL DISPATCH, http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2009/05/19/turning-out-the-
lights-nebuad/ (May 19, 2009, 7:52 EST).
47 Phorm, Inc., http://www.phorm.com/index.php (last visited Aug. 27, 2009); Phorm,
Inc. Advertising, http://advertising.phorm.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2009) ("By partnering
directly with ISPs, [Phorm's platform service] can draw from the greatest supply of brows-
ing information and avoid the limitations of purely site-based data."); see also Darren Wa-
ters, Home Office 'colluded with Phorm', BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8021661.stm (stating that "Phorm serves up adverts
related to a user's web browsing history that it monitors by taking a copy of the places they
[Vol. 18
Little Brother's Big Book
business models based on partnering with ISPs to create profiles of Internet
users and serve them with targeted ads.48 The privacy concerns over this inva-
sive technique and the resulting data were illustrated during a 2008 hearing of
the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet where Ne-
buAd CEO Bob Dykes affirmed that individual consumer profiles would be
kept anonymous and secure and would be purged if a user chose to opt-out of
having his data collected. 9 Congressman Cliff Steams challenged Dykes' as-
sertions that users' profiles do not contain information the user views on "sen-
sitive subjects," asking, "how do we know that you avoid that? I mean, we just
take your word for it?"5 While the Congressional scrutiny helped result in the
shuttering of NebuAd5  and the suspension of the British ISP BT's use of
Phorm's services,52 Congressman Steam's question remains unanswered.
In addition to the broadening and deepening of personal information collec-
tion, data collection systems are also becoming more centralized. Data brokers
like Acxiom and LexisNexis, which acquired ChoicePoint in September
2008,"3 have created comprehensive, individual profiles that are more than the
sum of their parts.54
C. "The Fourth Amendment Two-Step": Private Collection, Government Use
The real revelation, however, is not in how private entities are collecting
personal information; it is in how that information is being used. Because the
go and search terms they look for.").
48 Austin, supra note 46 (describing NebuAd's ability, through its partnership with
ISPs, to monitor users' "activities across multiple Web sites without their express permis-
sion"); Jacqui Cheng, UK ISP Drops Phorm Behavioral Ad Tech-for Now, ARs TECHNICA,
July 6, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/07/uk-isp-ditches-plans-for-
behavioral-ad-techfor-now.ars.
49 See What Your Broadband Provider Knows about Your Web Use: Deep Packet In-
spection and Communications Laws and Policies: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and the Internet, 109th Cong. 1-8 (2008) (statement of Bob Dykes, CEO,
NebuAd, Inc.), available at http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/cmte mtgs/110-ti-
hrg.071708.Dykes-testimony.pdf.
50 John Timmer, Markey to NebuAd: "When did you stop beating the consumer? ", ARS
TECHNICA, July 17, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2008/07/markey-to-nebuad-
when-did-you-stop-beating-the-consumer.ars.
51 See Austin, supra note 46.
52 Hannah Benjamin, BT Delays Use of Phorm Service, WSJ.coM, July 6, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 124689052552600797.html.
53 LexisNexis ChoicePoint, Overview,
http:// www.choicepoint.com/about/overview.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
54 See, e.g., ChoicePoint, Frequently Asked Questions About Your ChoicePoint Full
File Disclosure, http://www.choicepoint.conI/documents/ffdfaqs.pdf (last visited Oct. 8,
2009) ("ChoicePoint consumer files contain a compilation of various information about
individuals that we maintain in our consumer reporting databases.").
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government has had, and continues to have, an enormous role in affecting the
rights and lives of its citizens, government surveillance has long been viewed
as "far more ominous" than when the private sector engages in similar activi-
ties.5 While Richard A. Posner, prior to serving as a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, dismissed appeals for privacy in the
private-sector context as presumptively manipulative and injurious to the or-
derly operation of society,56 the reality of modern private data collection, both
its scope and its potential use by government entities, should give him pause.57
With the rise of the Internet and massive private data collection, the United
States government has increasingly turned to privately held information as a
way to bolster its knowledge about its citizens." This partnership has blurred
the line between privately held data and government data, resulting in a quan-
dary for Posner and the worst of both worlds for consumers: unregulated pri-
vate collection combined with highly consequential government use.59 The FBI
is one of many government agencies that routinely purchases information from
ChoicePoint to supplement its investigations; in fact, one FBI agent admitted
that "[t]he success of an investigation is often directly proportional to the in-
formation [from ChoicePoint] we can gather on suspects."6 The information
55 Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
SuP. CT. REv. 173, 176 (positing that the rationale for viewing government surveillance as
more ominous is because "[t]he government is not subject to the discipline of the market-
place which will punish a private firm or individual who demands information beyond the
point where the value of the information equals the price of obtaining it."); see also The
Government Sector: The Greatest Menace to Privacy By Far, PRIVACILLA.ORG, Sept. 2000,
http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Threats-toPrivacy.html (cataloguing the extraordinary
reach of government surveillance programs past and present, including Carnivore, Echelon,
Know Your Customer, National Individual Health IDs, CALEA, and the Clipper Chip).
56 Posner, supra note 55, at 175-76.
57 Id. at 176. Posner recognized this distinction noting, "Where, however, the informa-
tion is not sought by members of the public, acting as it were in self-protection, but by the
government, the claim of privacy as secrecy is stronger." Id.
58 See Arshad Mohammed & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to
Data Mining, WASH. POST, June 15, 2006, at D3 (citing the profiling of teenagers for poten-
tial military recruiting and travelers for border searches); see also Posting of Ryan Singel,
Flying Without ID? Know What's in Your Files, to Threat Level,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/07/flying-without/ (July 18, 2008, 16:43 EST) (cit-
ing a TSA program that uses LexisNexis information to quiz air travelers on their personal
information if they are unable to produce their identification).
59 To be fair, Posner has since recognized this quandary. Richard A. Posner, Privacy,
Surveillance, & Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 245, 257 (2008) ("The government's ready access
to the vast databases that private and public entities compile for purposes unrelated to na-
tional security has enabled it to circumvent much of the protection of privacy that civil liber-
tarians look to warrant requirements to secure.").
60 Harris, supra note 26, at 33-34; see also Associated Press, Obama Keeps Some Bush
Secrets, MSNBC.coM, Apr. 19, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30292790 ("[T]here is
no public list of all the databases the FBI sucks into this computer warehouse; no informa-
tion on how individuals can correct errors about them in this FBI database; and no public
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held by private data aggregators is driving government action in areas such as
the Federal Aviation Administration's No-Fly List, background checks, and
increased border scrutiny.61
Julian Sanchez, paraphrasing Judge Posner, has characterized this common
situation as the "Fourth Amendment Two-Step": when privately held informa-
tion that the government could not constitutionally gather on its own is instead
acquired from non-governmental third-parties.62 The first step of this end run is
found in the logic of California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, which concerned a
provision of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 requiring that banks keep records of
their transactions and make them available to the government upon request.
63
The Supreme Court held that such a requirement does not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the government "neither searches nor seizes records in
which the depositor has a Fourth Amendment right."' The second step is
found in United States v. Miller, which held that banks could be required to
maintain records of their customers' transactions and that individuals lose their
"expectation of privacy" in such information when they turn it over to a bank
or another third party.65 This principle, that transactional data is presumptively
unprotected, continued three years later in Smith v. Maryland, in which the
Supreme Court extended the Miller rationale to phone numbers, finding that
individuals "know that they must convey numerical information to the phone
company," and therefore they cannot "harbor any general expectation that the
numbers they dial will remain secret."66
Less than ten years after Miller, California v. Greenwood presaged security
researcher and author Bruce Schneier's conception that "[d]ata is the pollution
access to assessments the bureau did of the warehouse's impact on Americans' privacy.").
61 See, e.g., Our Data, Ourselves, supra note 11; Singel, supra note 58; Behar, supra
note 25 (explaining that the TSA's Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System
("CAPPS II") program, since discontinued due to privacy concerns, was largely driven by
data from Acxiom).
62 See Julian Sanchez, The Fourth Amendment Two-Step, TECHDIRT, Jan. 27, 2009,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20071127/173344.shtml.
63 California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (finding that the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 does not violate the Fourth Amendment by requiring banks to maintain
records which are then available to the government via subpoena).
64 Id.
65 See United States v. Miller 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976), partially superseded by
statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. Xl, 92 Stat. 3697
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2006)), as recognized in SEC v. Jerry T.
O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984). The Supreme Court held that the government did
not violate a bank customer's Fourth Amendment rights when the government subpoenaed
the bank for the customer's bank records because "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for
a limited purpose .. "). Id. at 443.
66 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
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of the information age."67 In the context of physical garbage, the Supreme
Court ruled that it is "common knowledge that... [trash] left on or at the side
of a public street [is] readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public."6 The result of the "Fourth Amend-
ment Two-Step" and the later cases is a legal conduit of personal information
from the citizen, through private data banks, and into government hands.69 Pos-
ner, himself no friend of privacy',7 nonetheless has observed that the Miller
line of cases is "unrealistic ... about the meaning of. . . 'privacy' itself.""1
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce's 2007 investigation of the
National Security Agency ("NSA") and the telecommunications industry high-
lights this conduit.72 The investigation concerned the voluntary, warrantless
disclosure of millions of customers' phone records by phone companies in vio-
lation of section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934."3 The law and the
private sector have created an efficient industry that "allow[s] law enforcement
to buy access to intricate dossiers on American citizens it couldn't otherwise
collect.""
7
67 The Tech Lab, supra note 13; California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
68 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40. But see id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Scrutiny of
another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior.").
69 See Solove, supra note 1, at 765 (stating that "the lack of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion of third party records results in the government's ability to access an extensive amount
of personal information with minimal limitation or oversight."); see also Solove, supra note
31, at 1085-86, 1090-93.
70 Judge Posner has written extensively on the value and disvalue of privacy, particu-
larly from an economic standpoint. His analyses are well known for their repeated conclu-
sions that privacy is economically (and therefore legally) inefficient. See e.g., Richard A.
Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1979) (likening pri-
vacy to a seller trying to cover up defects); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 406 (1981) (likening privacy to a prospective employee or spouse
attempting to conceal character deficiencies); Posner, supra note 55, at 174 (likening pri-
vacy to a police applicant concealing serious mental illness). For a defense of the value of
privacy, see Bruce Schneier, Commentary, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED.COM, May
18, 2006, http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70886-0.html.
71 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY 140 (2006).
72 Letter from John Dingell, Ed Markey, and Bart Stupak, U.S. Representatives, to Ran-
dall L. Stephenson, Chairman & CEO, AT&T (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/PDF/Letters/1 10-
ltr.100207.TI.ATTStephenson.pdf. The U.S. is not the only governmental example. The
U.K. Home Office consulted with Phorm on the legality of Phorm's operation, and appar-
ently allowed Phorm to assist in drafting the Home Office Opinion. Waters, supra note 47.
73 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006) (prohibiting disclosure of customer proprietary information
except as required by law or with customer's approval); Dingell et al., letter, supra note 72.
74 Nicole Duarte, Commercial Data Use by Law Enforcement Raises Questions about
Accuracy, Oversight, CARNEGIE-KNIGHT INITIATIVE ON THE FUTURE OF JOURNALISM EDUCA-
TION, Aug. 16, 2006,
http://newsinitiative.org/story/2006/08/16/commercial-data use bylaw.
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These examples illustrate that the potential harm of data aggregation by pri-
vate parties has changed with the amount and type of data collected; it is no
longer confined to the seemingly trivial invasion of increased advertising. In-
stead, private data aggregation now encompasses the non-trivial threats of in-
vasive use, misuse, and loss of the data, as well as the possibility that it can be
acquired and used by the government in ways that avoid constitutional and
statutory protections. In 1977, even before the modem era of computing and
networking, the U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission concluded that
"[t]he real danger is the gradual erosion of individual liberties through the au-
tomation, integration, and interconnection of many small, separate record-
keeping systems, each of which alone may seem innocuous, even benevolent,
and wholly justifiable."75
To explain the nature of the privacy *threat from this ubiquitous "Little
Brother" data collection, Solove proposes a corollary to the typical characteri-
zation of privacy intrusions in terms of George Orwell's dystopia.76 Instead of
casting private-sector data collection as the Orwellian-style surveillance state
usually identified with government and law enforcement, Solove characterizes
private-sector data collection as analogous to Franz Kafka's The Trial, in
which a "bureaucracy with inscrutable purposes uses people's information to
make important decisions about them yet denies the people the ability to par-
ticipate in how their information is used."" This model recognizes that infor-
mation technology consolidates power, and information asymmetries invaria-
bly affect the relationships between people and the institutions that make im-
portant decisions in their lives."8 The basic fact, which Kafka recognized in
1956 and Schneier articulated in 2008, that "who controls our data controls our
lives"79 must be translated into meaningful statutory action.
75 U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 533 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
76 See Solove, supra note 1, at 756-57.
77 Id. (citing FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 50-58 (Willa & Edwin Muir, trans., Random
House 1956) (1937)).
78 See SERGE GUTWIRTH, PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION AGE 85 (Raf Casnet trans.,
Rowman & Littlefield (2002)); Solove, supra note 1, at 757.
[T]he problems caused by surveillance ... affect the power relationships between peo-
ple and the institutions .... They not only frustrate the individual by creating a sense
of helplessness and powerlessness, but they also affect social structure by altering the
kind of relationships people have with the institutions that make important decisions
about their lives.
Id.
79 Our Data Ourselves, supra note 11; accord Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Partici-
pation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOwA L.
REV. 553, 560 (1995) (arguing that the use of data banks by the government and private
organizations "creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for free choice: the more that is
known about an individual, the easier it is to force his obedience.").
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D. The Need for Accountability
Schneier observes that nearly all day-to-day activities leave a permanent
digital record:
This data shadow doesn't just sit there: It's constantly touched. It's examined and
judged .... Whoever controls our data can decide whether we can get a bank loan, on
an airplane or into a country. Or what sort of discount we get from a merchant, or
even how we're treated by customer support. A potential employer can, illegally in
the U.S., examine our medical data and decide whether or not to offer us a job.80
Thus, there is a current and accelerating "personal information alienation,"
and that alienated information is being put to use in increasingly expansive
ways that affect the individual to whom they pertain.' Schneier and others
have called for a comprehensive data privacy law, 2 but enacting such a law
may be more difficult than it appears. Despite growing recognition of the po-
tential harm of data collection, comprehensive data protection laws have been
introduced but have not been enacted.83 This is in large part due to the slippery
nature of the concept of "privacy," in addition to the American conception of
data as belonging to the collector rather than the subject. '
As evidenced by the staggering depth and breadth of largely unregulated
data collection, the current legal regime is inadequate for the task of addressing
the complex relationship between an individual, his or her information, and the
company that holds it. In an article examining government use of commercial
databanks, Nicole Duarte found that "many of America's most important pri-
vacy protections do not apply to commercial data brokers."85 Professor Marcy
80 Our Data Ourselves, supra note 11.
81 PEEK, supra note 24, at 138. Other commentators have argued that
[o]ver the past few decades, there have been dramatic expansions in the quality, the
breadth, and the intensity of programs that use new generations of technology for gath-
ering, storing, sharing, and using information .... [I]f we add up the frequently over-
lapping profiles encompassing medical records, academic and professional perform-
ance, credit ratings, consumer behavior, insurance records, driving records, law en-
forcement data, welfare agency information, child support enforcement programs, In-
temet communications, and other information systems, it is safe to say that much of the
significant activity of our lives is now subject to systematic observation and analysis.
JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEER OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF
PRIVACY 2 (2001).
82 Our Data Ourselves, supra note 11.
83 See Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 69, 108th Cong. (2003); Data-
Mining Reporting Act of 2004, H.R. 4290, 108th Cong. § 3 (2004); Consumer Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 2005, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. § 102 (2005).
84 See Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21 (noting that after "the dot-coin bust, the
customer database was often the only salable asset a company had."); Aaron Titus, When
Did My Personal Information Become Your Property?, SECURITY CATALYST,
http://www.securitycatalyst.com/when-did-my-personal-information-become-your-property
(last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
85 Duarte, supra note 74.
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E. Peek terms these third party information dealers "[s]hadow offenders" 6 be-
cause they have no business relationship with the individuals they monitor; in
fact, they are generally unknown to society as a whole." Because data brokers
are not in privity of contract with users, users cannot sue them on a contract
theory, and thus "third-party entities have little incentive to protect, or even
ensure the accuracy of, personal data."8 What is needed is a minimal, baseline
level of accountability of the watcher to the watched. Thankfully, there is sub-
stantial and growing legal and political support for exactly this sort of privacy
legislation.
III. LEGAL AND POLITICAL WILL FOR CHANGE
Numerous federal and state laws, agency decisions, and public policies have
begun to slowly incorporate the idea of disclosure, audit, and responsibility to
the individual. 9 Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to catalog
them all, an overview of a representative sample will illustrate the growing
consensus that responsible and socially acceptable data collection must incor-
porate certain elements, in particular, the right of audit.
A. Legislative Efforts
In the context of some legislative efforts, "required disclosure" means a data
collector's obligation to "clearly and accurately" convey to the consumer what
information the collector has on him or her.98 The most prominent example of
required disclosure is found in the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").9"
Prompted by Congress' recognition that private credit bureaus had "grave re-
sponsibilities" to act with "fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the con-
86 PEEK, supra note 24, at 139.
87 See Behar, supra note 25 (providing that Acxiom's customers "include nine of the
country's top ten credit-card issuers, as well as nearly all the major retail banks, insurers,
and automakers."). At Acxiom, people-or at least their digital doppelgangers-are a prod-
uct, not a customer.
88 PEEK, supra note 24, at 139; see also Julian Sanchez, Secrecy Plus Immunity Elimi-
nates Accountability, TECHDIRT, Nov. 7, 2007,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20071106/155324.shtml (suggesting that the general para-
digm of not requiring disclosure and failing to have a framework for corrective action in-
variably removes all incentives, save for "public-spiritedness," for companies to reject gov-
ernment demands for the personal data those companies have collected).
89 See infra Part III.A-D.
90 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (a) (2006).
91 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681x. See generally Electronic Privacy
Information Center, The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Privacy of Your Credit




sumer's right to privacy," the FCRA was the federal government's first statu-
tory attempt to regulate the use of personal information by private businesses.92
The basic principles found in the FCRA would be used to lay the ground work
for subsequent data privacy legislation;93 foremost among these principles was
a right of audit and correction.94 In 2003, Congress strengthened these princi-
ples by passing the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA"),
which allows individuals to request a free annual credit report from each of the
credit bureaus,95 as well as the ability to opt-out of pre-approved credit offers96
that can be both a nuisance and an identity theft risk. As Sobel et al. have ob-
served, "[t]his simplistic approach ... [of] notice ... consent and access...
has become the mantra to protect individual privacy rights nearly three decades
after its passage."97 The rationale behind passage of the FCRA was that con-
sumers were being adversely affected by financial institutions having inaccu-
rate credit scores on them and that consumers were having a difficult time
keeping accurate track of their credit score.98 Despite the broad applicability of
its principles,99 the FCRA was limited to credit reporting agencies."° While the
FCRA does not extend to data aggregators, the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") has concluded that were data aggregators to expand their dossiers to
include credit information, they would likely fall within the FCRA."'0
Several other notable statutes followed the principles contained in the
FCRA. The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, commonly known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"), is a successor in spirit to the FCRA. 2
Narrow in its applicability like the FCRA, the GLBA is limited to financial
institutions' disclosure of financial information, and relies on notice and opt-
out as its main tools for regulating the relationship between the subject and the
data collector."3 Beyond the realm of financial information, the Health Insur-
92 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2006); accord Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 57-58.
93 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602, 84 Stat. 1127, 1128 (1970)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(b)); see SOBEL ET AL., supra note 9, at 58 (providing that the
Act "requires that credit reporting agencies follow 'reasonable procedures' to protect the
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of credit information.")
94 Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 58.
95 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (a)(I)(A) (2006).
96 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (a)(1)(A) (2006); see Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability:
Data Security and Personal Information, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 111,
116 (Anupam Chander et al., eds., 2006).
97 Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 58.
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
99 See 15A Am. Jur. 2D Collection and Credit Agencies § 34 (2009).
100 See Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 57-58.
101 Letter from William Haynes, Attorney, FTC, to Sylvia Sum, Esq. (Sept. 15, 1999),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/sum.shtm (providing an advisory opinion
that data aggregators likely fall under the FCRA).
102 See Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 58.
103 Id.
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ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA")'" applies the prin-
ciples of disclosure, opt-out, access, and correction to an individual's health
information and medical records." 5 Both the GLBA and the HIPAA, like the
FCRA, are notable for their limitation of otherwise broadly applicable princi-
ples to specific industries."6 The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
("COPPA") changed this pattern by focusing on a particular class of individu-
als rather than an industry. 7 While mainly targeted at ISPs, COPPA provides
rights of access, modification, and deletion across all businesses that may have
contact with children.'
Because of the amorphous nature of "privacy," legislative efforts have fo-
cused on "specific areas of perceived abuse and vulnerability,"'" rather than on
comprehensive reform. This has resulted in a statutory framework that pro-
vides only sectoral vindication of broadly applicable interests."
B. Agency Principles
In contrast to the industry-specific approach taken by legislators, many fed-
eral agencies have recognized the need for broadly applicable principles that
hold true regardless of the actor or the industry.
The 1973 "Code of Fair Information Practices" ("CFIP")"' is a particularly
strong example of the "bundle of sticks" approach to defining responsible data
collection. The Code is a result of an extensive study by the Advisory Commit-
104 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).
105 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2008) (describing rights of disclosure and access); 45 C.F.R. §
164.526 (2008) (describing a right of correction); see also SOBEL ET AL., supra note 9, at
58-59.
106 See Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 57-58; see also discussion infra Part III.B, of the
CFIPP and the FIPP, which proposes principles similar to those in the FCRA as being best
practices, broadly applicable to data collection across all industries.
107 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); SOBEL ETAL., supra note 9, at 59.
108 Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 59.
109 Id. at 57.
110 See id (arguing that the piecemeal approach has left significant holes in privacy pro-
tection); Suzanne M. Thompson, The Digital Explosion Comes With a Cost: The Loss of
Privacy, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 31 (1999) (explaining that "[t]here are no universal fair
information guidelines or practices that can be applied to ensure the protection and privacy
of personal information. Under the U.S. scheme, no single standard cuts across boundaries
of law or industry practice." (citation omitted)). See also infra Parts III.B and Part IV, for a
discussion of the components of data privacy which are broadly recognized but inconsis-
tently protected by existing statutory and common law frameworks.
'1 SEC'Y's ADVIS'Y COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COM-
PUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
CODE OF FAIR INFO. PRACTICES XX-XXi (1973) [hereinafter FAIR INFO. PRACTICES]; see also
SOLOVE, supra note 96, at 124.
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tee on Automated Data Systems, which was established by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human
Services)."' The CFIP, as the name implies, lays out the practices required to
ensure that a data collection system is fair to its subjects. Two of the five con-
clusions of the CFIP stand for a right of audit. The second and third principles
of the Code are, respectively, "[t]here must be a way for a person to find out
what information about the person is in a record and how it is used," and
"[t]here must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about the person.""3 However, because the Department of Health
and Human Services' Privacy Rule extends only to "covered entities," the
CFIP principles have not been applied as generally as they might otherwise
be."' Thus, the CFIP does not have a great deal of weight, despite its early and
important formulation." 5
By contrast, the FTC, which has adopted a very similar suite of principles,
has a large and growing role in the regulation of data storage and privacy. " 6
The FTC's "Fair Information Practice Principles" ("FIPP") are an attempt to
crystallize the "core principles of privacy protection"" 7 and include an em-
phatic acknowledgement of the role of the subject, including requirements of
112 FAIR INFO. PRACTICES, supra note 111, at xix.
113 Solove, supra note 96, at 124.
114 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Health Information Privacy: Covered Enti-
ties, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/index.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2009).
[Only] [i]ndividuals, organizations, and agencies that met the definition of a covered
entity under HIPAA must comply with the Privacy Rule's requirements to protect the
privacy of health information and must provide individuals with certain rights with re-
spect to their health information. If an entity is not a covered entity, it does not have to
comply with the Privacy Rule.
Id.
"5 Solove, supra note 96, at 124 (calling the CFIP "the most coherent and well-
established set of duties that have been articulated for the use of personal data.").
116 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 64 (providing that in regulating
data privacy issues, "[t]he FTC relies on its authority to regulate 'unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce' under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act"); see also Jim Walden et al., Data Breaches Mean More Than Bad Publicity, N.Y.L.J.,
May 15, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202421396867 (noting that
in 2006, the FTC created the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection to investigate data
breaches. By March 2008, the FTC had investigated many businesses and brought twenty
cases against businesses that allegedly had not taken reasonable security measures to protect
"sensitive consumer information"). See generally Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2221, the
Data Accountability and Protection Act, and H.R. 1319, the Informed P2P User Act, H.
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 11 1 th Cong. (2009) (statement
of the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/05/P064504peertopeertestimony.pdf
(describing the Commission's position and efforts on protecting consumers' data security).
"7 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (1998), available
at http://ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm [hereinafter FIPP].
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access, redress, and participation."'
Additionally, in 1988, several defense-related agencies refused to turn over
employee addresses, concerned that such disclosure would be a "clearly un-
warranted invasion" of privacy." 9 In Department of Defense v. F.L.R.A., the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the agencies, 2 ° recognizing that "[a]n individ-
ual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding per-
sonal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be avail-
able to the public in some form.' 2 Justice Scalia, quoted earlier regarding an
individual's privacy interest, or lack thereof, in their groceries,'22 joined the
majority opinion."'
C. Multinational Acknowledgement
Foreign governments and multinational organizations have also arrived at
the same conclusions, with remarkable consistency. While a full exploration of
the recurring constellation of personal data rights in international law is beyond
the scope of this Comment, the importance of foreign and multinational formu-
lations to the development of privacy principles cannot be overstated. Several
resources provide valuable insight into the legal and social understanding of
privacy abroad.'24
D. Private Sector Practices
The private sector itself has also acknowledged that consumer access is
good for business. LexisNexis, a leading data storage company, provides in
their privacy policy a restatement of their "Data Privacy Principles," which
touches on many of the same elements as the FTC's FIPP and the former De-
l18 Id.
119 U.S. Dep't of Defense v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487, 489 (1994). The case began after
two labor unions sought, for the purpose of collective bargaining, employee names and
home addresses from the U.S. Dept. of Defense and the U.S. Dept. of the Navy. Id. at 490.
120 Id. at 504.
121 Id. at 500.
122 Solove, supra note 19.
123 5 10 U.S. at 489.
124 See, e.g., RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 42-49,
204-230 (1989) (observing approaches to privacy laws in Britain). See generally INTERNA-
TIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY LAWS (Michael Henry, ed. 2001) (comparing
legal and social conceptions of privacy across many countries, in light of the laws and rights
recognized); see also SERGE GUTWIRTH, PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION AGE 87 (Raf Ca-
sert trans., Rowan & Littlefield Pub. 2002) (finding that the right of access and the right of




partment of Health, Education, and Welfare's CFIP' 25 LexisNexis' "Access
and Correction" principle allows individuals to review personally identifiable
information it maintains about them, although LexisNexis does not appear to
accept corrections directly from the subject.'26 Similarly, Acxiom has "Global
Privacy Principles" and "U.S. Product Privacy Principles," both of which in-
clude a right of notice, access, and correction.'27
E. Reform Initiatives
Finally, there has been significant legislative effort toward data privacy re-
form. Several promising, comprehensive bills have been proposed in the last
several Congresses, but each has died along the way.'28 The most recent ver-
sion of a comprehensive personal data reform bill is S. 1490, the Personal Data
Privacy and Security Act of 2009 ("the Act"). 29 The Act prominently contains
a right of review that applies to data brokers as well as civil penalties for viola-
tion.'30 Despite the valuable components in the Act, it also makes some subtle
but important missteps in implementation that will be discussed in Part IV.
Nonetheless, the Act's reoccurring presence on the Senate docket"' indicates a
will for change and support for holding data collectors accountable to those
whose data they collect. In addition, the House of Representatives declared
January 28, 2009 as "National Data Privacy Day" in an effort to "encourage[]
individuals across the Nation to be aware of data privacy concerns and to take
steps to protect their personal information online."'
3 2
While introducing the 2007 version of the Personal Data Privacy and Secu-
rity Act, Senator Patrick Leahy declared that the right of consumers to review
the sensitive personal information that data brokers have on them is "a simple
125 Compare LexisNexis, Data Privacy Principles,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/privacy/data-privacy-principles.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2009),
with FAIR INFO. PRACTICES, supra note I 11, and FIPP, supra note 117.
126 LexisNexis, supra note 125.
127 See Acxiom, Global Privacy Principles,
http://www.acxiom.com/about_us/privacy/Pages/Privacy.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2009)
(describing general policy principles); Acxiom, Highlights for U.S. Products Privacy Policy,
http://www.acxiom.com/about-us/privacy/consumer-information/highlights-for USprodu
ctprivacy~policy/Pages/HighlightsforUSProductsPrivacyPolicy.aspx (last visited Sept. 2,
2009) (offering the public the ability to access and correct information in Acxiom's direc-
tory for a processing fee of five dollars).
128 See, e.g., Data Security Act of 2007, H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Account-
ability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007).
129 See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111 th Cong. (2009).
130 S. 1490, §§ 201-202.
131 See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 11 0th Cong. (2007);
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005).
132 H.R. Res. 31, 111th Cong. (2009).
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matter of fairness" for which there is "clear precedent" in U.S. law.'33 Interna-
tional policy, good business practice, and growing consumer demand also sup-
port the idea that the collectors of personal data have a fundamental obligation
to the individual.'34 While there are several options for addressing consumer
privacy concerns, a limited right of audit is a more proactive and more feasible
method of ensuring accountable and responsible data collection.
IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION
In addressing problems associated with personal data collection, courts have
generally relied on traditional elements of law, such as tort and contract.' Un-
fortunately, the practices of data collection and the harms associated with its
misuse do not map well onto the established legal frameworks.'36 Part IV ex-
amines some of the legal and practical approaches to personal data account-
ability.
A. Effective Disclosure and Opt-in
"Closed Loop Confirmed Opt In" ("opt-in") is an industry best practice-
part law and part procedure-which ensures consumers awareness about the
collection and use of personal information about them, and requires their active
consent for such collection and use.'37 In this sense, opt-in is firmly rooted in
133 153 CONG. REc. S1628 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
134 See, e.g., Remarks of Christine A. Vamey, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Con-
sumer Privacy in the Information Age: A View from the United States (Oct. 9, 1996), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/varney/priv&ame.shtm (noting that consumer demand
for privacy grew out of increased data-gathering capabilities in the same way that increased
data-gathering grew out of the burgeoning global information economy); LexisNexis, Data
Privacy Principles, supra note 125; Acxiom Privacy Principles, supra note 127 (recognizing
privacy protection as good business policy); APEC, APEC Privacy Framework,
http://www.apec.org/apec/news media/fact sheets/apec_privacyframework.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2009); Official Journal of the European Communities of 23 November 1995
No L. 281, Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EUDirective.html (recognizing the data subject's
right of access to their personal data as a fundamental policy).
135 See Walden et al., supra note 116 (discussing the case law and implications of infor-
mation torts); see also Peek, supra note 24, at 138-47 (discussing the uses and shortcomings
of contract and quasi-contract-based approaches to data privacy violations).
136 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease about Privacy Law, 154 U. PA. L. REv.
PENNUMBRA 52, 52 (2006), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1000&context=-annbartow (critiqu-
ing Solove's privacy analysis for "fram[ing] privacy harms in dry, analytical terms that fail
to sufficiently identify and animate the compelling ways that privacy violations can nega-
tively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings beyond simply provoking feelings
of unease.").
137 Chris Thompson, Confirmed Opt In: A Rose by Any Name, SPAMHAus, Aug. 11,
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the contract law principle of informed consent, and it is a critical component of
a framework for improving the collection of personal data.' Opt-in require-
ments solve "the most egregious inequality of the current opt-out system: the
disparity in knowledge between the average user and the company collecting
information."" 9 Properly deployed, this approach ensures that customers and
subjects are aware of the collection and how the information will be used. This
is an important first step that is easily implemented and is therefore widely
used (albeit at varying levels of earnestness) by companies who wish to collect
information.4 ° However, opt-in only goes so far in addressing the problem be-
cause it only affects data collection at the threshold point, when it is first col-
lected from the customer. 4' Responsible data collection does not ensure that
future uses of the data are equally responsible.'42 Thus, while opt-in is an im-
portant part of responsible data collection, it is insufficient by itself.
B. Breach Notification
Nearly every state in the country has enacted breach notification legisla-
tion. "'43 As defined in California Civil Code section 1798.82, the statute that
started the trend toward nationwide breach notification laws,'" a breach means
2008, http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso?article=635 ("Closed Loop Confirmed Opt In is
the full technical term for the best opt-in subscription practice around.").
138 See Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 57-58 (characterizing the constellation of rights,
including opt-in, provided by various data protection statutes as contractual and quasi-
contractual in nature).
139 Andrew Hotaling, Comment, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the
Internet: Notice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 COMMLAW CONSPEC-
mis 529, 557-58 (2008) (noting that opt-in forms a foundation to further data rights in that
"[w]ithout knowledge of the companies' identities, users have no means of correcting the
inequality and reasserting some measure of control over their privacy on the Web.").
140 See Anupam Chander, Introduction, in SECURING PRIVACY 1N THE INTERNET AGE 6
(Anupam Chander et al., eds. 2008) ("Consent, a seemingly simple idea, is much less clear
when faced in terms of opt in and opt out, pre-ticked tick boxes, half-buried links to privacy
policies, and incomprehensible legal language.") (quoting Lilian Edwards, The Problem
with Privacy: A Modest Proposal, 18 INT'L REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 309, 323 (2004)).
141 See Edwards, supra note 140, at 320.
142 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 1, at 757-59 (explaining Solove's taxonomy of privacy
intrusions that differentiates the information collection from later states of information proc-
essing and information dissemination).
143 Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2009) (pro-
viding that forty-five states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
have laws requiring data holders to notify subjects of breaches that involve personal infor-
mation).
144 Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 (West Supp. 2009); see also Alan M. Mansfield, Is Your
Client Prepared To Comply With the Data Security Breach Notification Laws?, ASS'N Bus.
TRIAL LAW. REP., Spring 2007, at 15, available at http://www.abtl.org/report/sd/abtl-report-
spring-2007.pdf.
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"unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security,
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the person
or business."'45 Thus, breach notification is the simple principle that the subject
of the data has a right to know and the holder of the data has a duty to disclose
what has become of his or her data if the security of that data has been com-
promised." These laws have helped protect those affected by data breaches
and have pressured companies to strengthen their data protection policies.'47
However, breach notification can only do so much. By their nature, these laws
are remedial rather than proactive; they do not provide the subject of the data
any notification until it has been lost.' In addition, breach notification laws
typically do not cover the legal and intentional uses of a subject's information
about which the subject may nonetheless wish to be informed.'49
Unlike opt-in and breach notification laws that provide victims with specific
actions at law for the exposure of their information, much data-breach litiga-
tion is pursued using laws not specific to the collection of personal data. 5 °
Courts and case law primarily approach the problem through "causes of action
grounded in tort and contract."''
145 § 1798.82(e). "Personal information" is defined as
an individual's first name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or
more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data elements are not
encrypted: Social security number, Driver's license number or California Identification
Card number, account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any
required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an indi-
vidual's financial account, medical information, or health insurance information.
Id.
146 See Bruce Schneier & Marcus Ranum, State Data Breach Notification Laws: Have
they Helped?, INFORMATION SECURITY MAGAZINE, Jan. 2009,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineFeature/0,296894,sid l 4gci 1344729,00.html
(explaining one rationale behind breach notification laws as "common politeness that when
you lose something of someone else's, you tell him.").
147 Pam Greenberg, Right to Know, STATE LEGISLATURES, Dec. 2008, at 26-27, available
at http://ecom.ncsl.org/magazine/articles/2008/08sldec08_right.pdf; see also Chander, supra
note 140, at 4 (observing that after a massive data breach in 2005, data broker ChoicePoint
initially planned to only disclose the breach to California residents as was required under
California law). Complaints from affected individuals across the country caused Choice-
Point to notify impacted consumers even in states without breach notification laws. Id.
148 See Schneier & Ranum, supra note 146 (characterizing breach notification laws as
being more effective at "butt-covering and paperwork than improving systems security.").
149 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82 (2009) (focusing on a "breach" as the primary
threat, resulting from an overly narrow conception of personal data privacy).
150 Walden et al., supra note 116.
151 Id. (listing "negligence, breaches of fiduciary duty, breaches of real and implied con-
tracts, invasion of privacy and emotional distress ... [and] state law, such as consumer pro-




Tort law could provide a framework for victims of privacy abuses to be
made whole and, at the same time, punish and deter bad actors. In 1890, Sam-
uel Warren and Louis Brandeis introduced the common law privacy rights by
framing the privacy protections in the language of tort law,'52 a conception that
was eventually included in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'53 Data breach
cases provide an example of how the facts of a typical privacy violation fair on
the negligence rubric of duty, breach, causation, and harm.'54
1. Duty
The duty to protect and maintain the confidentiality of information can be
can be inferred from any one or more of the patchwork of privacy laws such as
the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA").'55 Despite its comprehensiveness,
however, the GLBA may not be well suited to supplying the duty element to
support a tort claim. In Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service Corp., a
plaintiff filed suit against a student loan provider for negligence in exposing
his personal information.'56 Guin claimed that under the GLBA, Brazos Higher
Education Corp. ("Brazos") had a duty to protect customers' nonpublic per-
sonal information.' Brazos conceded that under the GLBA it had a duty of
care for the protection of such information.'58 The district court ultimately held,
however, that Brazos' actions were not inconsistent with the duty of care cre-
ated under the GLBA and granted Brazos' motion for summary judgment.5 9
The failure of this approach illustrates how the idiosyncratic obligations of the
data privacy patchwork can undermine attempts to rely on them in the pursuit
of tort law remedies.
152 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193,
211-20 (1890).
"3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652d (1977). But see Solove, supra note 1, at
755 (rejecting Brandeis & Warren's conception of privacy as "the right to be left alone" as
far too broad to perform meaningful legal work).
154 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
155 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned Hand's Negligence
Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 237, 242
(2007) (suggesting that those who are injured by data breaches protected by the GLBA
could use a negligence per se argument to hold the data holder liable).
156 Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Services Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4846, *1 (D.
Minn. Feb. 7, 2006).
157 Id. at *8.
118 Id. at *8-9.
159 Id. at *10.
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2. Breach
The breach component, at least in the case of data breach cases, is more
straightforward. According to Judge Learned Hand's formula from United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., a breach occurs when the respondent fails to take
precaution commensurate with the risks. 6 ' Thus, merely showing a failure to
reasonably secure the data (under the Learned Hand formula) or a failure to
comply with applicable statutes (such as the GLBA) will, when combined with
exposure, be sufficient to show breach.
3. Harm
Damage is the most difficult element for a plaintiff to prove in a data breach
case. As the court explained in Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., when
surveying a series of data breach cases, a plaintiffs "allegation of increased
risk of identity theft ... without more, is insufficient to demonstrate a cogniza-
ble injury."'' These cases illustrate the typical pattern of data breach cases and
explain why tort law has been largely unsuccessful in addressing data privacy
concerns. The law is hesitant to provide a remedy for the de minimus harm of
increased exposure to identity theft, and unwilling to consider mere "feelings
of unease"'62 in that analysis.'63 As law professor Ann Bartow has explained,
"[the] lack of blood and death, or at least of broken bones and buckets of mon-
ey, distances privacy harms from other categories of tort law."'" Especially
with regard to the element of harm, this distance is often too great to utilize tort
law as a practical remedy for data privacy violations.
D. Contract Actions
As discussed in the context of opt-in, the theory of contract law is also ap-
plicable to data privacy protection. In fact, Sobel et al., argue that the data pri-
160 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947) (noted in
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 155, at 242).
161 Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2007)
(citing Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *4 (D. N.J.
July 31, 2006); Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005
WL 2465906, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005); Guin v. Brazos Higher Ed. Services Corp., No.
05-668, 2006 WL 288483, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 06-
485, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (S.D. Ohio
2006)).
162 See Bartow, supra note 136, at 52.
163 See cases cited supra note 161.
164 Id. But see Solove, supra note 1, at 768 (providing examples of cases where victims
have been murdered by assailants who were able to locate the victims by obtaining their
personal information from public records).
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vacy debate to date has been "conducted over an unacknowledged tectonic
plate of contract principles."' 65 Like "privacy torts," however, contract actions
have only had limited success. While corporate privacy policies or terms of
service may appear to provide courts with a firmer basis for finding a breach of
duty, courts have concluded that "broad statements of company policy do not
generally give rise to contract claims."'66 Additionally, the peripheral nature of
privacy issues to many transactions means that the plaintiff may have difficulty
pressing a claim that he specifically relied on the express or implied privacy
policies.'67 Finally, contract actions require privity of contract to have standing
to assert any claim.'68 Because of the distributed and mobile nature of informa-
tion, data breaches and privacy violations are often committed by third parties,
such as data brokers, 69 who are not in privity with, and often not even known
to, the potential plaintiff.'76 This tendency toward a lack of privity is likely part
of the reason why companies are lax in their protection or discretion in storing
and using personal data.' Especially in cases of data brokers, privity is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to show because the subject has no contact with the col-
lecting entity and may not even know that the broker possesses the informa-
tion.
E. Quasi-Contract and Restitution
To avoid the privity problem of pure contract theories, Peek suggests using
restitution as a legal method to tie the business to the subject.'72 Quasi-contract
theory, unlike pure contract, does not require the bargaining, consent, and priv-
ity that has proven to be a sticking point in data privacy cases.'73 Instead, it fo-
cuses on unjust enrichment and restitution: a firm that has profited by using a
subject's data must "restore the benefits" that have unjustly enriched the firm,
165 Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 56.
166 See Solove, supra note 1, at 769 (quoting Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) and In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 2004
WL 1278459 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004)).
167 See id.
168 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 309 (1979).
169 See infra Part II.D; see PEEK, supra note 24, at 139.
170 Peek, supra note 24, at 139. For an examination of how private litigation has failed
because it did not use contract law, see Sobel et al., supra note 9, at 60-63.
171 Peek, supra note 24, at 139.
172 Id. at 140-47.
173 Id. at 153, n.61 (quoting Univ. of Colorado Found. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d
1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); DCB Constr. Co. v. Cent. City Dev. Co., 965
P.2d 115, 119 (Colo. 1998) (stating that unjust enrichment causes of action arise "not from
consent of the parties, as in the case of contracts expressed or implied in fact, but from the
law of natural immutable justice and equity.")).
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if that profit has come at the expense or exposure of the subject.'74 While the
idea that the subject has a property right to their personal data is a novel ap-
proach,'75 quasi-contract does not require that the subject be dispossessed of
any property or even have a right in it.'76 Rather, in restitution, the benefit and
the harm are separate and do not rely on one another, a disjunction particularly
well-suited to the world of personal data, which exists in many places simulta-
neously.'77
Quasi-contract, however, is not a conclusive solution. Like tort approaches,
quasi-contract suits suffer from a difficulty of valuation. Even if the court is
prepared to accept that the enrichment is unjust, such as in cases where misuse,
mishandling, or loss of the data has disadvantaged the plaintiff, the actual val-
ue of this enrichment is difficult to show.'78 In fact, compared to tort damages
that can, at a minimum, be grounded in the need to pay for identity theft pro-
tection and credit reports, restitution damages are unhelpfully amorphous. The
courts that dismissed Guin and Randolph are unlikely to be any more receptive
to claims of damages based on the increased threat of identity theft or nebulous
harm of "information alienation.'
79
F. Piecemeal Protection: The Need for Something More
The largest problem facing common law approaches to data privacy prob-
lems is the amorphous nature of privacy itself. As discussed, "the concept of
'privacy' [is] ... too vague and unwieldy a concept to perform useful analyti-
cal (and hence, legal) work.""'8 The intuitive concepts of fairness and reciproc-
ity do not naturally map onto the legal requirements of duty and tangible dam-
ages. A right of audit is a legally and practically feasible way to begin tying
these concepts together to better translate the abstract concept of "privacy" into
specific legal interests that the law can deal with and protect more readily.
174 See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 925 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. App.
1996); see also Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1278 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoted
in Peek, supra note 24, at 150, n.30) ("[I]n unjust enrichment [cases] ... the recovery
granted is not based upon a contract and.., the underlying standard for the recovery is the
net benefit conferred upon the defendant.").
175 See Corien Prins, Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodifi-
cation of our Identity, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIc DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW 224-25 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (noting little
discussion of such a proposed right outside of the United States).
176 See Peek, supra note 24, at 141.
177 See infra notes 201 and 202.
178 Peek, supra note 24, at 143-45 (noting that valuation of enrichment is complicated by
the potential for significant asymmetry between the benefit to the defendant and the loss to
the plaintiff).
179 See id. at 1308.
180 See WACKS, supra note 3, at 10- 11.
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V. PRIVATE RIGHT OF AUDIT
A. A Look in the Books - Right of Audit Defined
A right of audit is a discrete, limited responsibility of the data holder to the
subject of that data.'' It does not give the subject a property interest in the data,
or limit what the collector can do with the information-consistent with the
American view of information as being the result of the work of the collector
and thus the collector's property."2 What a right of audit does do is set a mini-
mum level of accountability in the form of disclosure that the information ex-
ists, what it consists of, how it was collected, and how it is being used.
Essentially, a right of audit is a way to give legal force to the important, but
non-legal, concept of fairness that is offended when personal information is
alienated from the person it concerns.' The recurring use of "fair" in the pri-
vacy law context hints at this goal as an underlying motivation for much of the
privacy principles and legislation already in existence. 4 The most notable and
well established right of audit is incorporated into the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, ' 5 and the Fair Information Practice Principles are the guiding document
on the subject at the FTC.'86 Fairness, in the collection of personal information,
dictates that the subject of the collection have at least as much information as
the entity collecting it. This basic premise gives rise to three component rights
that should be considered in crafting an effective right of audit: (i) Access, (ii)
Correct/Annotate/Delete, and (iii) Source/Distribution.
181 The right of audit is analogous to the OECD's "Individual Participation Principle"
which the OECD Expert Group recognized as "[not] . . . absolute," but nonetheless "clear
and specific." ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF INFORMATION 43
(2002), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en 2649_34255_1815186_1 1 1_1,00.html.
182 See Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21; Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy,
and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2056-57 (explaining that American compa-
nies view personal data as a corporate asset). The proposed right of audit deliberately stops
short of establishing an individual's ownership right in the data, a premise which, taken to
its logical conclusion, "would almost certainly produce a citizenry that spends half the next
century in courtrooms ... to keep other people from sharing this or that snippet of knowl-
edge without permission .. " David Brin, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY
FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 91 (1998).
183 153 CONG. REC. S1628 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
184 See supra Part II.B.
185 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 168 1i(a)(l)(A) (2006).
186 FED. TRADE COMM'N., PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELEC-
TRONIC MARKETPLACE 17-18 (2000).
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B. Access
The general idea of a right of review is not controversial." 7 It is almost uni-
versally accepted by both government and private entities and is incorporated
into federal and state law, as well as private business practices.' Differences
in implementation, however, can result in widely differing effectiveness. The
Transportation Security Administration's ("TSA") Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program ("TRIP") requires that individuals show a specific grievance in order
to access the TSA's audit procedures.'89 Credit reporting agencies are only re-
quired to allow consumers to check their credit report annually without
charge. 9 ' Finally, the right of audit proposed in the Data Privacy and Security
Act of 2009 was restricted to data brokers and would not have included com-
panies that nonetheless have substantial amounts of personal information, such
as ISPs and private companies who purchase consumer information from data
brokers. 9' Additionally, the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009
would allow brokers to charge subjects a fee to access their own data.'92 Such
details could greatly affect the actual ability of a right of review to effectively
inform individuals. Part VI below examines these implementation details and
provides several recommendations.
The right of review alone, however, is as ineffective as it is uncontrover-
sial.'93 Merely being aware of the contents of a dossier provides little comfort
or help to an individual troubled by potential inaccuracies or misuses of that
information. Review is the critical first step, but in order to be effective, it must
be supported by ways in which the individual can respond to the information
'87 See generally supra Part III.E.
188 See generally supra Part III.
189 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Activities and Programs, DHS Traveler Re-
dress Inquiry Program, http://trip.dhs.gov/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (providing a limited
selection of grievances that TRIP is intended to address).
190 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A)
(2006).
191 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111 th Cong. § 201(c)(1).
Section 3(5) defines a "data broker" as:
a business entity which for monetary fees or dues regularly engages in the practice of
collecting, transmitting, or providing access to sensitive personally identifiable infor-
mation on more than 5,000 individuals who are not the customers or employees of that
business entity or affiliate primarily for the purposes of providing such information to
nonaffiliated third parties on an interstate basis.
S. 1490, § 3(5).
192 S. 1490, § 201 (stating that "[a] data broker shall, upon the request of an individual,
disclose to such individual for a reasonable fee all personal electronic records pertaining to
that individual").
193 Like the data-breach notification rules, a bare right of access could become less of a
tool for consumers to manage their personal information and more of a tool for data holders
to minimize their exposure. Cf. Schneier & Ranum, supra note 146.
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he or she receives.
C. Correction, Annotation, and Deletion
An individual's right to correct or delete privately held data about them-
selves would seem to be a natural outgrowth of the right to review. Indeed,
many of the most important codifications of privacy rights recognize the logic
that a right of review is hollow without the corresponding right to act on the
information.'94 But while the best practice of requiring notice and "opt in"
would seem to suggest an uncontroversial ability to "opt out," the value of ac-
curate individual records makes this less symmetrical than it appears. Because
a right of correction and deletion would require a company to accept the user's
modifications of the information that it has expended effort to collect, a right
of correction or deletion is likely to be troubling from a business standpoint
and, consequently, a legal one.'95 Companies dealing with their customers gen-
erally have contracts or user agreements that outline their information collec-
tion policies and grant the company the right to create and maintain the re-
cords.196 A right of correction would largely conflict with the rights given to the
company in such a contract. In the case of third party commercial data collec-
tors, such as data brokers, this type of provision would be even more trouble-
some because the records themselves are often corporate assets.'97 Scholars
have recognized that tampering with companies' rights to use this data may
194 See, e.g., FIPP, supra note 117. In addition to the U.S. government's CFIP and FIPP
codifications, the right of correction is also acknowledged across the private sector and in-
ternationally. The dual rights of access and correction have been a part of many of the major
data privacy initiatives, including the EU Directive on Privacy in 1995. Official Journal of
the European Communities of 23 November 1995 No L. 281, Council Directive 95/46, art.
12, available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU Directive.html.
195 See Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21; see Titus, supra note 84 (noting that
personal data is similar to property in that it has value and is fungible).
196 See, e.g., PayPal, Privacy Policy for PayPal Services, http://www.paypal.com/cgi-
bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/policyprivacy-outside (last visited Sept. 4, 2009) ("This policy
describes the ways we collect, store, use and protect your personal information. You ac-
cepted this policy when you signed up for our Service."); Facebook, Privacy Policy,
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Sept. 4, 2009) ("By using or accessing
Facebook, you are accepting the practices described in this Privacy Policy.").
197 Schwartz, supra note 182, at 2056-57; Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21; see
also Twitter, Twitter Privacy Policy, http://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
Twitter's privacy policy provides:
Twitter may sell, transfer or otherwise share some or all of its assets, including your
personally identifiable information, in connection with a merger, acquisition, reorgani-
zation or sale of assets or in the event of bankruptcy. You will have the opportunity to
opt out of any such transfer if the new entity's planned processing of your information
differs materially from that set forth in this Privacy Policy.
Id.
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violate the property interest that the company has in its work product and also
represent a potential loss of the value of the asset.'98 Thus, while a right of cor-
rection or deletion has a certain logic to it and appeals to the individual-as-
owner model recognized in German law,'99 such a provision could be highly
burdensome and legally objectionable as a regulatory taking under the Fifth
Amendment."°
An alternative to correction, employed by the Australian government via its
National Privacy Principles, is annotation, which would allow the subject to
provide his own information. 0' While annotation does not go as far as correc-
tion and deletion in giving the subject control over his data, it is attractive be-
cause it avoids the taking problem and could therefore be more palatable to
businesses and constitutional lawyers.
D. Source and Distribution
An inherent characteristic of digital data is its ease of distribution.0  Once
198 Vera Bergelson, It's Personal but is it Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 440 (2003) (citing Fred H. Cate, The Changing
Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV.
173, 207 (1999) (expressing concern that "[i]f the government prohibits the processing of
personal data, it could deny the owner all or most of the 'economically viable use' of that
data.")).
199 See Thomas R. Kltzel, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PER-
SONALITY LAWS 164 (Michael Henry ed., 2001) (providing a brief overview of Germany's
Federal Data Protection Act of 1991, which vindicates an individual's "general personality
right" to be protected against unlimited collection, use, and dissemination of personal data
by both the government and private sector entities).
200 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived... [of] property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation."); Bergelson, supra note 198, at 440.
201 Privacy Act, 1988, § 14 (Aus.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl .nsf/0/ABDE256EO5DF7
DD6CA2576080018DAE4/$file/Privacyl988_WD02.pdf.
Where: (a) the record-keeper of a record containing personal information is not willing
to amend that record, by making a correction, deletion or addition, in accordance with
a request by the individual concerned ... the record-keeper shall, if so requested by the
individual concerned, take such steps ... as are reasonable in the circumstances to at-
tach to the record any statement provided by that individual of the correction, deletion
or addition sought.
Id.
202 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitu-
tion, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1152 (2002); see also Simson Garfinkel, Separating Equifax
from Fiction, WIRED, Sept. 1995, at 96, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.09/equifax.html (citing Columbia University Profes-
sor Alan Westin's statements that "[a]lmost inevitably, transferring information from a ma-
nual file onto a computer triggers a threat to civil liberties, to privacy, to a man's very hu-
manity because access is so simple").
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information has begun to be disseminated on the Internet or through the net-
work of data aggregators, it is extremely difficult to identify the original source
and the extent of the distribution." 3 Affiliate sharing programs,2" whereby data
brokers purchase databases (or even whole companies)," 5 as well as sales of
customer records as assets, can quickly propagate an individual's data
throughout the information ecosphere.2 °6 Neither the right of review nor the
right of correction has any real force if the subject cannot identify the source or
recipient of the information that he or she is reviewing. The Personal Data Pri-
vacy and Security Act of 2009 acknowledges this concept peripherally,2 but
the language of the Act contains an important misstep with regard to informa-
tion disclosure. Specifically, under section 201(d), data brokers would be re-
quired to disclose to those individuals who have had their data breached by
third parties, at no-cost to the individual, the identity of the providing broker,
the identity of the requesting entity, and a copy of the information itself.2 Al-
though the requirement of active disclosure and identification of the providing
and requesting parties is laudable, the language is both too vague and too un-
derinclusive to provide a model for an effective right of review. It is too vague
in that it does not define "adverse actions." Even if it did, such an attempt
would be largely futile since the uses of information are as diverse as the in-
formation itself, and a legislature would be hard pressed to craft a definition
that encompassed all the adverse uses to which an individual's data could be
put. More importantly, the adverse actions disclosure would only apply when
an adverse action is actually taken by a third party.209 In contrast to these weak
protections, a better model for protecting individuals can be found in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, which allows individuals to see who has accessed their
information whether or not any action was taken." '
203 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How TO STOP IT 226
(2008) (contrasting current data practices in the context of the hypertext-based Internet with
that of sociologist and information technology futurist Theodor Nelson's idea of dynami-
cally linked "transclusion" that would make subsequent references dependent on the original
source).
204 See Hoofnagle, supra note 37.
205 See Harris, supra note 26 (observing that as of 2004, data broker ChoicePoint has
purchased forty-two companies, some of which it bought to acquire the data they owned).
206 See Your Vanishing Privacy, supra note 21.
207 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
208 S. 1490, § 201(d).
209 S. 1490, § 201(d). Section 201(d) specifies that "if a person takes any adverse action
[they] ... shall provide [notice]". This means that the action is complete before notification
is made.
210 15 U.S.C. § 1681j.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In addition to the component rights of the right of audit, there are more pro-
cedural implementation issues that will make a big difference in how effective
the right is operationally. Taking a cue from the strengths and weakness of
other legislative actions such as the FCRA and the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 2 ' what follows is a pragmatic analysis of how to best ensure that the
components discussed in Part V, (Review, Correction/Annotation/Deletion,
Determine, and Source and Distribution) are packaged so as to be deployed
effectively. A review of the development of the FCRA and the FOIA, supple-
mented by other pertinent cases, will illustrate four procedural components that
are vital to the viability of the proposed statute and its effectiveness upon com-
ing into force. The law must: a) be discrete and "swallowable" so that it can
move through the legislative process; b) apply broadly and not be limited only
to data brokers; c) be procedural and not substantive; and d) not pre-empt state
laws.
A. "Swallowable"
Professor Wacks' statement that the "false god of privacy" should be
avoided212 meant that legislators and policy makers should not attempt to estab-
lish or protect an amorphous "right of privacy" but should instead establish and
protect those rights that contribute to a state of being that better accords with
the important, but non-legal, notion of privacy." 3 In essence, start small.
While Bruce Schneier and other privacy advocates push for broader and
more comprehensive privacy laws,214 a single, discrete principle with clear im-
plications and a straightforward implementation is a more effective route for-
ward at this time when increasing obvious need meets increasingly conspicu-
ous inaction.2 5 It is often easier to build on an existing right than to create one
211 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007). In recommending the FOIA
legislation for adoption, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported that it "would es-
tablish a much-needed policy of disclosure .. " S. REP. No. 813, at 10 (1965) The House
agreed, finding that it would provide the "machinery to assure the availability of Govern-
ment information necessary for an informed electorate." H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 12 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429.
212 WACKS, supra note 3, at 10.
213 See id. (referencing American legal scholar R.F. Hixson's argument that legislation
should "regulate clearly identified threats to sensitive information" (citing R.F. HIxsoN,
PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 98 (1987))).
214 See, e.g., Our Data Ourselves, supra note 11.
215 153 CONG. REC. S1628 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (referring
to the irony of Congressional leadership refusing to address the 2006 version of the Personal




from scratch. This is the lesson of the FOIA, which was largely toothless at its
inception but was significantly enhanced after Watergate, when the need for
accountability became more evident."6 Development of frameworks to handle
expansive and amorphous problems is best approached as an iterative task,
whether it be designing widgets or forming the European Union." 7 To avoid
policy paralysis, it is better to take a small first step than to continue the pattern
of comprehensive and ideal, but ultimately unsuccessful, legislative initiatives.
B. Broadly Applicable
To be effective, a right of review must reach all those entities that keep re-
cords that, if misused, stolen, or lost, could affect the individual. In this re-
spect, the demographic, transactional, and public records information held by
data brokers is less of an issue than substantive information such as purchasing
history information on eBay or the Web search information held by search en-
gines and ISPs.21 8 Despite its strong steps in the right direction, S. 1490 errs
because it is limited only to "data brokers," a restrictive definition as defined in
the legislation." 9 The language of S. 1490 specifically leaves out affiliate shar-
ing programs and in-house data mining operations like Kroger Corporation's
DunnhumbyUSA,22 ° and does not even contemplate applying to corporations as
a whole.22'
216 Alan F. Westin, Information, Dissent, and Political Power, in WATERGATE AND AF-
TERWARD: THE LEGACY OF RICHARD M. NIXON 59 (Leon Friedman & William F. Levan-
trosser eds., 1992). Initially, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, §
3, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), lacked explicit procedural requirements such as public indices of
agency information, timeframes for agency action on FOIA requests, recovery of reasonable
attorney fees, or annual reporting on the administration of FOIA. Congress later modified
the act to address these shortcomings, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (b)(l)P.L. 93-502 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
217 See, e.g., Video: David Kelley, Design as an Iterative Process (Oct. 10, 2001), avail-
able at http://academicearth.org/lectures/design-as-an-iterative-process ("How quickly you
get to the first crummy prototype ... is directly proportional.., to how successful the prod-
uct will be."); see also JEREMY JOHN RICHARDSON, EUROPEAN UNION: POWER AND POLICY
MAKING 42 (2006) (characterizing treaty reform and European Union integration as an itera-
tive process which is the result of "incremental, institutional adjustments .... ").
218 See Omar Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, UTAH L.
REv. 1433, 1441-45 (2008). While data breaches have only an attenuated risk of financial
harm, AOL's disclosure of Web search records had a much more immediate impact on the
lives of its customers. Id. at 1443-44. Additionally, last year, a federal judge ordered
Google to provide Viacom twelve terabytes of data on viewers of its YouTube Web site.
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 07 Civ. 2103(LLS), 07 Civ. 3582(LLS), 2008 WL
2627388, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008). The records included un-obfuscated IP addresses
and time stamps that together effectively create a personally identifiable viewing history. Id.
219 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111 th Cong. § 201 (2009).
220 See Sewell, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
221 See S. 1490, § 201.
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C. Procedural, Not Substantive
The rules that provide a framework for privacy protection can be procedural:
addressing how personal information is collected and used by governing the
methods by which data collectors and data providers interact.22 Alternatively,
the rules can be substantive, governing what can be collected and what it can
be used for."2 While many countries include substantive limits on the types of
data that can be collected and their permissible uses,224 such fine-grained deci-
sions would needlessly hamstring this proposed legislation. Procedural rules
are better suited to early action because they are more straightforward in im-
plementation and implications. Moreover, the experience gained under the pro-
cedural rules can help shape more effective and better tailored substantive rules
if and when they become appropriate. 25
D. No Federal Pre-Emption
One of the great values of having multiple jurisdictions is the opportunity to
experiment. While data brokers like LexisNexis argue for federal preemption
as a way to avoid "struggling with complying with multiple potentially con-
flicting and inconsistent state laws," '226 federal preemption would in fact be
counterproductive to advances in both consumer privacy and pro-business pri-
vacy law innovation.227 Inconsistencies in state law are often the vanguards of
222 See, e.g., Aaron J. Burstein, Amending the ECPA to Enable a Culture of Cybersecu-
rity, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 168, 208 (2008) (highlighting HIPAA Privacy Rules as an in-
structive model possessing both procedural and substantive elements).
223 See, e.g., id.
224 See GuTWIRTH, supra note 78, at 87 (tracing the occurrence of substantive limits on
data collection and use from the OECD framework back at least forty years to the French
"Law Relative to Computer Science, to Records, and to Liberties"); see also id. at 119 (pro-
viding that Article eight of the 1995 European Community directive on the "processing of
personal data," provides substantive restrictions on "personal data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and
the processing of data concerning health or sex life."). See generally INTERNATIONAL PRI-
VACY, PUBLICITY, AND PERSONALITY LAWS (Michael Henry, ed. 2001) (providing summary
overviews of the privacy and data protection laws of twenty-nine countries).
225 The version of the FOIA that President Johnson signed into law was principally sub-
stantive without a procedural framework. See Westin, supra note 216 and accompanying
text. Ultimately, either approach would satisfy the "first step plus iterations" approach urged
by Kelley. See Kelley, supra note 217. Of the two, the procedural-first "if you build it, they
will come" approach seems more likely to be effective.
226 Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a Counterbalance Between Privacy and
Commercial and Government Use: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109thg
Cong. 11-12 (2005) (statement of Kurt P. Sanford, President & CEO, U.S. Corporate and
Fed. Gov. Markets, LexisNexis).
227 See Solove, supra note 96, at 117 (characterizing the federal pre-emption element of
the FACTA as significantly undercutting the Act's benefits by preempting more protective
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important policy change and legal innovation, as evidenced by California's
breach notification law that helped lead to the large scale media interest and
ensuing public pressure following the 2005 ChoicePoint incident.28 Because of
the disclosure requirements, the breach drew national attention to California's
then unique law which ultimately served as the template for breach notification
laws that have since been adopted nationwide." 9 A patchwork, state-by-state
approach is not only feasible for data holders, it is the status quo for much of
privacy law. 30 It also benefits the consumer and the data holder because it cre-
ates a market of ideas where effective legal innovation is adopted and stan-
dardized. 3 ' Despite industry concerns, like those voiced by LexisNexis, 232 pre-
emption cuts both ways: it provides states the opportunity to come up with
ways are ultimately pro-business, but which would run afoul of one-size-fits-
all federal preemption.2 33 The potential for this sort of pro-business/pro-
consumer innovation is illustrated by a 2008 California bill that would have
allowed differential insurance premiums for drivers who opt for an automobile
black box and significant savings, instead of privacy. 34 The Sarbanes-Oxley
state statutes).
228 See id. at 112.
229 SYNOVATE, FED. TRADE COMM'N - 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 55 n.45
(2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/ll/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf
(explaining that "[s]ince the passage of the California statute, over 30 other states have
passed some form of breach notice law."); see also Walden, et al., supra note 116 (noting
that the California statute has "served as a model for many other states").
230 See Chander, supra note 140, at 3 (describing the current state of privacy law as
"cobbled together from a disparate array of federal statutes, a few state laws, and common
law .... [with] no overarching framework, but rather episodic privacy protections for lim-
ited domains and in certain circumstances."). For most large corporations, variations in the
law from state to state pale in comparison to the variation in international privacy law.
Compare, e.g., Acxiom, Global Privacy Principles,
http://www.acxiom.com/about us/privacy/Pages/Privacy.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2009)
(describing general policy principles); with Acxiom, Highlights for U.S. Products Privacy
Policy,
http://www.acxiom.com/aboutus/privacy/consumerinformation/highlights for US_produ
ctprivacypolicy/Pages/HighightsforUSProductsPrivacyPolicy.aspx (last visited Sept. 2,
2009) (detailing privacy policies specific to the U.S. market).
231 See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (describing the federal system as allowing "a single courageous state ... to serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.").
232 Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a Counterbalance Between Privacy and
Commercial and Government Use: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 11-12 (2005) (statement of Kurt P. Sanford, President & CEO, U.S. Corporate and
Fed. Gov. Markets, LexisNexis).
233 See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902 (2008)
(discussing the benefits and drawbacks of federal preemption in the area of privacy legisla-
tion). Schwartz concludes that a "federal omnibus information privacy law" . . . "would
limit further experimentation in federal and state sectoral laws." Id. at 946.
234 A.B. 2800, 2008 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
[Vol. 18
Little Brother's Big Book
Act,235 adopted in response to major corporate accounting scandals,"' is an ex-
ample of legislation that is intended to set a federal baseline protection that
does not preempt state law and can be improved upon if a state desires.237
E. Central Clearinghouse for Requests
Finally, to both simplify administration and reduce the costs imposed on
private data holders, a federal right of audit should be accompanied by provi-
sions for the creation of a central clearinghouse for audit requests. This clear-
inghouse would most naturally fit under the auspices of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, which currently manages a similar data protection pro-
gram for victims of identity theft.
238
Such a clearinghouse has precedent and has served as a model for several
successful federal and private-sector programs.239 Perhaps the closest analogue
to the proposed clearinghouse is the constellation of "nationwide consumer
credit reporting agencies" that developed in response to the "free annual dis-
closure" provisions of the FACTA.24° While AnnualCreditReport.com, the offi-
cial, centralized source of free credit reports created by Equifax, Experian and
TransUnion, is the best known result of FACTA's provisions, provisions of
FACTA also apply to myriad smaller players across a variety of industries,
such as the Medical Information Bureau24" ' (provider of medical records) and
ChoicePoint's C.L.U.E. service (provider of insurance reports).242 Interestingly,
the FTC has repeatedly declined to publish a list of companies that qualify as
"nationwide specialty consumer reporting agencies." '243 This shortcoming in
implementation of the FACTA illustrates how a national clearinghouse could
235 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
236 Rob Norton, The Cure for Lavish Pay? Shame It to Death, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
2002, at BI.
237 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303(c), 116 Stat. 745 (stat-
ing that "[tihe provisions of subsection (a) shall be in addition to, and shall not supersede or
preempt, any other provision of law or any rule or regulation issued thereunder.").
238 See Fed. Trade Comm'n., Division of Privacy and Identity Protection,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcppip.shtm (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
239 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n, National Do Not Call Registry,
http://www.ftc.gov/donotcall (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
240 See Annual Credit Report, About Us,
https://www.annualcreditreport.com/cra/helpabout (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
241 See MIB Group, New Breed of Identity Crime: Medical Identity Theft,
http://www.mib.com/html/medical id-theft.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
242 See LexisNexis ChoicePoint, FACT Act, http://www.choicepoint.com/factact.html
(last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
243 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Facts on FACTA: The Fair and Accurate Credit
Transaction: Consumers Win Some, Lose Some, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-
facta.htm#8 (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).
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help translate the will for change into actual gains for the consumer.
VII. CONCLUSION
Privacy may be difficult to define, but privacy rights are ultimately quite
straightforward. By avoiding the temptation to reach for all-encompassing de-
finitions or comprehensive statutes, a simple initiative can begin to succeed
where more ambitious efforts have repeatedly failed. The right of audit, while
narrowly circumscribed, does not continue the unfortunate trend of haphazard,
piecemeal protection that has often characterized previous statutory efforts.
Instead, it vindicates a small constellation of discrete rights across all actors
and industries, in keeping with the tradition of the more successful formula-
tions of privacy rights." While the important but amorphous value of privacy
certainly deserves more than this rudimentary protection, it must be recognized
that addressing complex problems is an iterative process.245 Legislators and
policy makers should acknowledge that the growing importance of data pri-
vacy policy means that something must be done, and that now is not the time
to let perfect be the enemy of good.246
APPENDIX EXAMPLE STATUTE
The following text provides simplified statutory language to illustrate how a
right of audit might be implemented.
An Act
To authorize the Federal Trade Commission to implement
and enforce a "Right ofAudit" in data held by private entities and to
create a "Consumer Information Clearinghouse" to administer the pro-
gram.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
244 See Section I.B.
245 See Kelley, supra note 217.
246 See VOLTAIRE, LA BtGUEULE (1772).
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION47
1.1 Congress finds that-
(a) databases of personally identifiable information are a powerful re-
source which play a fundamental role in the convenience, accuracy, speed, and
power of commerce and communication in a computer-mediated society"248
(b) the extraordinary power of these databases means that:
(i) insecure and unreliable information management creates risks from
threats both malicious and systemic which have the potential to disrupt and
undermine the livelihood, liberty, confidence and privacy ofAmericans as well
as compromise the efficiency and effectiveness of business and government
operations;
(ii) secure and reliable databases are integral to the advancement of na-
tional priorities such as economic stability, national security, the continued
development of e-commerce, and the privacy rights ofAmericans;
(c)because governmental use of commercial databases of personally identi-
fiable information affects the critically important areas of individual privacy
and national security, Congress must provide for oversight of the use of these
databases; and
(d) "individuals whose personal information " is used or held by data ag-
gregators have a legally recognized expectation of 'fairness, transparency,
accuracy, and respect for the privacy of consumers; ," and
(e) "therefore the foregoing reasons, data aggregators have a concomitant
obligation to meet that expectation.
SECTION 2: DEFINITIONS
2.1 Information Aggregator - The term "information aggregator" (herein
"aggregator" or "holder") means a business entity collects personally identi-
fiable information on more than 5,000 individuals;..' and:
247 Adapted from section 2 (Findings) of the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of
2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007).
248 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, THE DIGITAL PERSON 14-27 (2004), available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/Digital-Person/text/Digital-Person-CH2.pdf (chro-
nicling the revolutionary effect of computers and digitization on public and private sector
databases).
249 S. 495, § 2(9).
250 Id.
25' The term "information aggregator" is used to differentiate the broader concept of
"private entities holding extensive personal information" from the more limited term "data
brokers," which has come to be used, as in S. 495, to refer only to those entities whose prin-
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(a) sells, leases, or otherwise disseminates the information for a fee; 52
(b) data mines or aggregates,
(c) purchases, trades, or acquires records from an information aggre-
gator253
2.2 Personally identifiable information - Personally identifiable information
is that information or combination of information which can identify a particu-
lar individual. Personal Information includes but is not limited to a person's
name; biographical details, present or past addresses, contact information,
identifying number or code; educational, medical, criminal history or employ-
ment history or other identifying particulars inherent or assigned to the indi-
vidual, "such as afingerprint, voiceprint, DNA, iris image, or photograph. "254
2.3 Anonymous Information - Combinations of personal information which
cannot be tied to an identifiable individual are "anonymous data" which are
not covered under this statute.255
2.3 Data mining - The term "data mining" means the combination of self-
reported or otherwise verified data about an identifiable individual to produce
information that was not provided to the aggregator and not composed offacts
or history, and/or is speculative, predictive, or evaluative of the character,
habits, or behavior of an identifiable individual.
ciple business is the collection and dissemination of information. Cf Personal Data Privacy
and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 1 10th Cong. § 3(5) (2007). The Act defines a "data bro-
ker" as
a business entity which for monetary fees or dues regularly engages in the practice of
collecting, transmitting, or providing access to sensitive personally identifiable infor-
mation on more than 5,000 individuals who are not the customers or employees of that
business entity or affiliate primarily for the purposes of providing such information to
nonaffiliated third parties on an interstate basis.
Id.
The distinction is made clear as Solove notes:
[P]rivacy may be implicated if one combines a variety of relatively innocuous bits of
information. Businesses and government often aggregate a wide array of information
fragments, including pieces of information we would not view as private in isolation.
Yet when combined, they paint a rather detailed portrait of our personalities and behav-
ior, a problem I call "aggregation."
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 70 (2008).
252 This is intended to target the "data brokers" that were the primary target of Personal
Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007.
253 This targets the widespread practice of "affiliate sharing" where tenuously connected
businesses cooperate to provide one another with data. See Hoofnagle, supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
254 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
255 The provision for an "anonymous information" exception is intended to permit the
use of truly non-personally identifiable information in important research areas like medical
research. See, e.g., David Armstrong et al, Potential Impact of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on
Data Collection in a Registry of Patients With Acute Coronary Syndrome, 165 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MEDICINE 1125 (2005); Jamie Heywood, Forget Medical Privacy, WIRED 110-11
(Oct. 2009).
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2.4 Proprietary assessment - The term "proprietary assessment" means da-
ta-mining which is
(a) conducted on information pertaining to an identifiable individual who
has a direct relationship with the organization; and
(b) used to produce analysis which are maintained by the organization for
internal use and not sold, transferred, or otherwise disseminated
SECTION 3: SCOPE
3.1 No requirement of consumer relationship.
256
3.2 Excluded entities: This statute does not apply to:
(a) 501(c)(3) non-profit corporations
(b) Registered political parties
3.3 Excluded data:
(a) any data related to an individual's past purchases of consumer goods if
generated by the holder of the data; or
(b) any proprietary assessment or evaluation of an individual or any pro-
prietary assessment or evaluation of information about an individual if gener-
ated by the holder of the data.257
(c) any data that is not personally identifiable.
SECTION 4: RIGHT OF A CCESS
2 58
4.1 Upon request, an information aggregator must provide, in an under-
standable form, a copy of the personally identifiable information held on the
requestor unless:
(a) release of the information would unreasonably jeopardize the
health, safety, or privacy of other individuals; or
(b) "the request for access is frivolous or vexatious "; or
(c) providing access would likely prejudice present or future legal pro-
256 This addresses the "shadow offenders" problem that has stymied contract law ap-
proaches. See Peek, supra note 24, at 139.
257 These exclusions are intended to ease the burden on entities that deal in a high vol-
ume of records but whose activities neither draw from nor contribute to the larger informa-
tion ecosystem, thus minimizing their effect on the consumer. This exclusion functions as a
further structural incentive for companies to self regulate, in the way that Posner found to be
effective at checking the harmful effects of data aggregation in the private sector. See Pos-
ner, supra note 55, at 176 ("The government is not subject to the discipline of the market-
place which will punish a private firm or individual who demands information beyond the
point where the value of the information equals the price of obtaining it.").
258 This section is adapted largely from the Australian Government's "National Privacy
Principles." See Privacy Act, supra note 201.
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ceedings or criminal investigations.
4.2 Charges for access are permitted if they are
(a) commensurate with the actual cost for retrieving the information;
and
(b) not charged for filing the request itself
4.3 Correction: Upon a showing that the aggregator's information pertain-
ing to an individual is not accurate, complete and up-to-date, the aggregator
must take reasonable efforts to ensure that the inaccuracy is corrected.
4.4 Annotation: In the event of a dispute as to the accuracy of information
held by an aggregator, the organization must permit the individual to include
an explanatory note as part of the record.
4.5: Deletion: If the individual requests the record be deleted, the organiza-
tion must take reasonable measures to do so except where:
(a) the collection of the information is specifically allowed or mandated by
laws applicable to both the individual and the organization;
(b) the request would be unreasonably burdensome; or
(c) the request would compromise a current or anticipated investigation, le-
gal proceeding, or negotiation.
4.6 Denials of requests based on paragraphs 4.1(a) to (c) must consider
whether the information can nonetheless be released by either
(a) redacting the protected portions; or
(b) releasing the information through an intermediary
4.7 Justification: If the organization refuses a request for access, correction,
annotation, or deletion, the denial must cite the specific exception(s) invoked
and explain in reasonable detail why the exception(s) applies.
SECTION 5: THE CONSUMER INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE
5.1 To facilitate the administration of the terms of this statute, the Consumer
Information Clearinghouse shall be established under the auspices of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
SECTION 6: APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW
6.1 This law does not preempt state regulation of data aggregators.
(a) Each State shall apply the provisions of this act insofar as they are not
inconsistent with State law.
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SECTION 7: ENFORCEMENT
7.1 Actions by private persons
(a) In general - A person or representative of a person adversely affected by
data aggregation not complying with Section 4 of this Act may, "within 3 years
of discovery of the violation, bring a civil action in an appropriate district
court of the United States "" against the aggregator.
(b) Remedy - The remedies available for a civil action under this act in-
clude injunction to enforce compliance, monetary damages, and other relief
which the court may deem appropriate.
(c) Before or immediately after bringing an action under this act, the plain-
tiff shall serve written notice of the action, including a copy of the complaint,
upon the Commission.
The Commission shall have the right:
(a) to intervene in the action,
(b) upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein, and
(c) to file petitions for appeal."
7.3 "Actions by Commission
(a) In general - An action instituted under this Act by or on behalf of the
Commission shall prevent any further private actions under this Act against
any named defendants for the pendency of the action.
259 15 U.S.C. § 6104(a) (2006).
20091

